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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION, D. H. WHITTENBURG,
Chairman, H. J. CORLEISSEN
and LAYTON MAXFIELD, Members of the Engineering Commission,
Pla.intiff and Respondent,
-vs.FRED TEDESCO and KLEA B.
TEDESCO, his wife, et al.,
Defendants,
and
BIRD & EVANS, INC.,
Counter-Claimants
and Appellants.

Case No.
8270

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Generally, the respondent will be able to agree with
the statement of facts as set forth in the appellant's
brief; but in certain specific instances we disagree and
we also feel that there are some facts of importance
that are not included, particularly with respect to prior
l
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proceedings. We feel that the Court should have a
chrono1ogical picture of this matter and shall proceed
accordingly.
The 1951 State Legislature passed an act, which is
no"r Section 63-11-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which
act granted the State Engineering Commission ''power''
to condemn certain therein described real property for
a state park. The :first special session of the 1951 State
Legislature, in Section 1 of Chapter 13, Laws of Utah
1951, First Special Session, amended the act and ''authorized and directed'' the Commission to ''forthwith condemn'' the described property.
Accordingly, on July 10, 1951, the Engineering Commission adopted a resolution instructing the Attorney
General to proceed and suit was :filed and summonses
were served on the various defendants, one of whom was
Bird & Evans, Inc. as it w:as the record owner of Parcel 7
lying within the park boundaries established by the
legislative enactment. (R. 18)
We deem it appropriate at this point to specifically
call the Court's attention to the fact that a jury trial
was had as to Parcel 7 and that a jury's verdict in the
sum of $66,000.00 was paid and a :final order of condemnation as to Parcel 7 was entered by the Court on March
21, 1952. (R. 36 to 39) The land, which is the subject of
this action, was not contiguous to Parcel 7, was across
the canyon south from Parcel 7 and is au entirely separate tract and is wholly outside the park. (R. 87)
2
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Thereafter, and on April 1, 1952, the trial court
permitted the appellant, Bird & Evans, Inc., to file a
eross-complaint and this came on for trial on December
1, 1952, and a jury V\'"as impaneled. (R. 30-32) However,
fol]o,ving a ruling by the trial court that the case was
to be tried upon the theory that Kennedy Drive was
closed, this Court granted an intermediate appeal; and
by its decision, now reported in FJta.te v. Bird & Evans,
I-nc., 265 P. 2d 639, the trial court's ruling in this respect
,,~as reversed and the cause remanded to be tried in
accord with that opinion.
Follfnving remission to the District Court, a formal
motion to dismiss was made by the respondent and denied by the trial court. (R. 61) Trial was thereupon had
commencing on July 14, 1954, and, after a jury had been
selected, the motion to dismiss \vas again renewed and
urged upon the trial court and a ruling thereon was
reserved by the trial court. ( R. 67 and 68)

~

After the appellant had concluded his evidence, a
motion to dismiss was again made and again taken
under advisement ( R. 134) ; and, following the conclusion of ·the trial, a motion for a directed verdict \Vas
made based upon the same grounds and this motion was
also taken under advisement. ( R. 177)
·Following the verdict of the jury, a formal.written
motion was made for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the grounds were the same as had been urged
on the previous motions. ( R. 198 and 199) This motion
3
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thereafter argued on July 20, 1954, and on September 28, 1954, an order \vas made granting the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (R. 200)
The foregoing is a brief history of the litigation and
is, we believe, an important element to be considered in
this case. And, in addition to this, \Ve cannot agree with
appellant as to the alleged agreement between it and the
\Vagener Improvement Company. In this connection, we
do not believe that it is appropriate to pick out separate
sentences from the record and claim proof or lack of
proof of this supposed agreement. As an example,
appellants on page 5 of its brief says: "It was further
agreed that the costs of planning would be divided between the owners of the two tracts of land in proportion
to their land holdings, and, in fact, the very considerable
expense entailed in planning was so borne and was so
paid.'' It is indicated that this statement is derived
from the answer of the witness, Brayton, where he said,
''That is to say Wagener \\rould take care of all of the
expenses incident to its much larger area and then Bird
and Evans would take care of the expenses incident to
its area and did so, so far as I know.'' (R. 72) But there
is nothing in the record to show how much was expended
and by whom, and for what.
We must take issue with, and believe that this is the
place to do so, the statement by appellant that appears
on page 19 of its brief as follows: "The state does not
deny the existence of the agreement between Bird &
Evans and Wagener Improvement Company for the de4
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velopment of the Oak Hills Subdivision.'' We most
certainly do deny the existence of any such agreement.
We took specific exception to Instruction No. 1 to the
jury where the jury was permitted to consider this
agreement on the grounds that no agreement had been
proved. (R. 184-185) And we fully believe that the evidence of the witness, Dean S. Brayton, when read as a
whole negatives the existence of any agreement. The
best that could be said for it is that there was an expectatjon and a hope.
And finally, for the purpose of clarity and to avoid
repetition and because it is tied to both the facts and the
law, we feel compelled to set forth the three points that
were the basis for our motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and which are as follows :
1. That the State of Utah has not consented to be
sued herein and this Court is and has been without jurisdiction to entertain this action against the State of Utah.
2. That it affirmatively and conclusively appears
from all the proceedings herein that the subject matter
of this cause is not actionable against the State of Utah
and not compensable by the State of Utah; and that the
said cross-complaint of Bird & Evans, Inc. does not state
any facts upon which a claim against the State of Utah
could be based and that all the evidence fails to show a
claim against the State of Utah.
3. That Bird & Evans, Inc. has not sustained the
burden of proof required of it and that all the evidence
5
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affirmatively and conclusively show·s that any injury or
damage to it 'vas contingent, remote and speculative. (R.
198-199)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE CLAINI OF APPELLANT WAS NOT PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT,
BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, THE TRIAJ_j COURT
WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN
THIS ACTION AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH;
AND THE n10TION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS PR.OPERLY
GR.ANTED.
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGlvfENT FOR CONDE~1NATION .A.ND DESTRUCTION
OF ANY ALLEGED OR CLAIMED RECIPROCAL
COVENANTS; BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, ANY
ALLEGED DAMAGE OR INJURY TI-IAT APPELLANT CLAIMS TO HAVE SUFFERED IS NOT
ACTIONABLE AGAINST .A.ND NOT COMPENSitBLE BY THE STATE OF UTAH.
POINT III.
THE APPELLANT HAS NOT SUSTAINED THE
BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED OF IT AND THE
EVIDENCE AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS rrHATANY
ALLEGED INJURY OR DAMAGE TO IT WAS CONTINGENT, REMOTE AND SPECULATIVE.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF
AN AGREEl\iENT BETWEEN THE APPELLANT
6
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.A.ND WAGENER IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, AND
THE GRANTING OF THE 1fOTION FOR JUDGMENT NO~rWITI-ISTANDING THE VERDICT WAS
1)I{OPER, AS 1~I-IERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND
IVIATERIAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY
.itG·REEMENT.
ARGUJVIENT

POINT I.
THE

CLAI~I

OF 1\_PPELLAl'TT WAS NOrr PROPERLY COGNIZ~~BLE BEFOR]J 'l'HE TRIAI_j COlTRT,
BUT, ON TI-IE CONTRAI~r:, ~ri-IE TRIA~L C01TRT
\V ..:'\8 WJTIIOU~r JUiilSDICrriON TO ENTERT.A_IN
THIS AC/J~ION AGAINST rr,IIE STATE OF UTAH;
AND TI-IJn 1\IOr~riON FOR JUDGMENT NOrrWITI-ISTANDil~G

rrHE VERDICT "\VAS PROPERLY

GRANTED.

In respondent's motion to dismiss before the trial
court, we urged upon that court the sovereign status of
the State of Utah and its immunity from suit (R. 67).
We again urged this point in our motion for nonsuit (R.
134) and for a 'directed verdict (R.177); and in our formal
wTitten motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
v:e spelled out in paragraph one of that motion the same
grounds (R. 198). Appellant's statement at the bottom
of page 12 of their brief that "it may be that the state
has abandoned this position as counsel did not argue it
strenuously", is contrary to the fact and not in accord-ance with the record. We have steadfastly maintained
throughout the entire retrial of this proceeding that there
was a complete lack of jurisdiction as to the·· State of
Utah by reason of its sovereign immunity from suit
7
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without specific legislative consent. And, contrary to
appellant's statement, the cases of Iljorth c. Whitte1z.burg, 241 P. 2d 907, and State r. Fourth District f!ourt,
94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502, are specifically appli('able and
are the t'vo cases that 've contend conclusively support
the position "'"e have taken.
In order to present our position in this respect and
to correct the erroneous conception as presented by
appellant, it is necessary to briefly review the prior
appeal of this case, the reasoning urged upon that appeal
and the ruling this court now reported in State z,. Bird &
Evans, supra. Following a ruling by the trial court on
December 1, 1952, that Kennedy Drive was closed and
that appellant was entitled to go to trial on that theory,
this court granted a petition for intermediate appeal.
The State of Utah, as the appellant in that case, also
raised the question as to whether the pleading, then
entitled a cross-complaint, filed by Bird & Evans Inc.
was not covered by Rule 13(a) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure dealing with compulsory counterclaims.
This Court ruled that the cross-complaint of the
then respondent, Bird & Evans, Inc., "\Vas not a compulsory counterclaim under the language of Rule 13(a) and
also held that the trial court's ruling as to the. closing
of l{ennedy Drive was in error; and the case was reversed and remanded for proceedings in accordance with
the opinion of this Court. We desire to emphasize that
we have not, and do not now, question this Court's ruling
as to compulsory counterclaims ; and we desire to further
8
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emphasize that the present question as to the sovereign
immunity of the State of Utah was not an issue in the
former appeal and was not decided by this Court, either
directly or by implication.
Whether the pleading filed by Bird & Evans, Inc. is
termed a cross-complaint, as it was in the first appeal,
or whether it is a counterclaim, as appellant now refers
to it, is, we believe, immaterial; and under our view of
the problem it makes little, if any, difference whether
it was filed while the appellant was still a defendant in
the main condemnation action or, as was done here, after
its interest in that main action had been wholly terminated. No matter how it is viewed, it is an independent
suit against the State of Utah having as its subject
matter a completely new issue from that of the original
condemnation action; and, as such, it is subject to the
rules laid down in the Hjorth and Fourth District Court
cases, supra, which we will discuss hereinafter at more
length.
Appellant has cited Sections 78-34-7 and 10, Utah
Code Annoted 1953. At the risk of repetition but in the
interest of readability, we desire to also quote these
sections in order to call the Court's attention to the
specific language therein. Section 78-34-7 reads as follows:
''All persons in occupation
claiming an interest in, any of
scribed in the complaint, or in
the taking thereof, though not

of, or having or
the property dethe damages for
named, may ap-

9
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pear, plead and defend, each in respect to llis
own property or interest, or that claimed by him,
in the same manner as if named in the complaint.''
On page 11 of its brief appellant states that it filed
its counterclaim under the provisions of this section. 1\
careful examination of this section reveals that this
counterclaim or cross-complaint does not fall within the
permissive language of this section.
First, it should be noted that the property for which
appellant claims damage is entirely outside the boundaries of '!,his Is rrhe Place Monument Park and is not
described, nor is any part of it mentioned, in the complaint filed herein by the State of Utah (R. 11 to 32,
incl.). The statute above quoted states ''All persons in
occupation of ... any of the property described in the
complaint." Clearly, appellant does not fall within that
language. The second grouping is ''All persons . . .
having or claiming an interest in any of the property
described in the complaint.'' Again it is clear and conclusive that appellant's claim is not covered. And the
final group is ''having or claiming an interest ... in the
damages for the taking thereof,'' i.e., the property described in the complaint. vVe urge that none of the
language in this section gives to this appellant the right
to ' 'appear, plead and defend. ' ' It specifically refers to
the property described in the complaint for 'vhich condemnation is sought and admittedly the appellant here
is not in occupation, claims and has no interest in it and
claims and has no interest in the damages for the taking
thereof. To attempt to read into this section a right to

10
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appear and claim damage for property not sought to be
condemned and lying \vholly "\Yithout the boundaries of
the property described in the complaint appears to us
to be fantastic. If this were to be the law, it would have
infinite ramifications and there could be no possible conelusion of even the simplest of condemnation proceedings.
In its decision in Hjorth '[;'. Whittenburg, supra, this
Court said:
''If all the property to 1Nhich any consequential
harmful effects had to be considered, and the
owners joined as condemnees by the Road Commission, it vvould be difficult if not impossible for
the Commission to kno"\Y whom they could safely
omit from condemnation proceedings. The only
safe \vay in "\vhich the Commissioners could operate \\~ould be to join every property owner abutting on or near the highway projects in order to
avoid suits "'Which \\'Ould result in personal liability to them. The irnpracticability of imposing
such an obliga.tion upon the public body in the
construction and maintenance of our public highways is obvious." (The italics are ours.)
As a final comment on this phase, may \Ve note that
the rule sought for by appellant in this case would affect
all public bodies clothed with the po"Ter of eminent domain and would require the joinder of an infinitely
greater number of defendants than under the rule sought
for by the plaintiffs in the Hjorth case. Under the language above quoted the utter ''impracticability'' is
''obvious.''
Section 78-34-10 contains five subparagraphs and the
three quoted by appellant are the only ones applicable
11
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here but \Ye contend again that they affirn1atively sho\\·
that appellant cannot maintain this action against the
State of Utah. This section reads as follo\VS:
"The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be
condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel
and of each estate or interest therein shall be
separately assessed.

(2) If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff.
(3) If the property, though no part thereof
is taken, 'vill be damaged by the construction of
the proposed improvement, the amount of such
damages ... " (Italics added.)
We call the Court's attention to the fact that the
first paragraph deals with property actually taken and
the second paragraph deals with what is commonly called
severance damage and that neither paragraph is applicable to appellant's property. It must, therefore, bring
itself within the provisions of paragraph three and we
most urgently contend that it does not and cannot qualify
under the language of that section. We have italicized

12
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the words ''construction of the proposed improvement,''
and the only conclusion that can be drawn from these
words is that the damages allowable must flow from this
construction. In the present case, there is no construction, no proposed construction and in fact the legislative
mandate for this condemnation specifically commands no
construction but rather that the park shall remain in its
natural state.
We have heretofore briefly alluded to the cases of
State v. Fourth District Court, supra, and Hjorth v.
Whittenburg, supra; and, as we contend that they are
controlling of the issue here presented, it becomes necessary to thoroughly examine the facts and the decision of
this court in each case.
In the Fourth District Court case certain residents
of West Center Street in Provo sought an injunction
against the State Road Commission and the contractor
engaged by the Commission to construct the viaduct over
the railroad tracks on this street. In this application
for injunction the plaintiffs alleged that they would be
deprived of access, that the viaduct would dampen and
darken their homes, that they would be deprived of their
easement to light, air and view, and that the grade of
the street would be raised ; and that, unless the injunction were granted, they would be deprived of their property rights without due process of law. The State Road
Commission and the contractor applied to this Court for
a writ of prohibition to prevent the District Court from
proceeding with the injunction suit. By its decision, this

13
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Court made the writ permanent as to the State l~oad
Commission denied it as to the contractor and indicated
'
that injunction proceedings against the individual members of the State Road Commission would be proper if
the plaintiffs in the injunction suit were to ask leave to
amend so as to include those individuals personally as
defendants. It should be noted that only three members
of this Court joined in the majority decision and that a
well written minority opinion was handed down by the
other two members of the Court, who contended that
the injunction suit against members of the Road Commission individually was not proper and that the remedy
was before the Board of Examiners.
But all five members of the Court held that the injunction could not be maintained against the State of
Utah and, on page 504 of the Pacific Reporter, the Court
said:
"The State Road Commission is an agency of
the State. It is clothed with certain powers in the
nature of corporate powers, but cannot be considered to be a corporation. It may sue in its
own name, and section (now 27-2-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953) provides that it may be sued
only on written contracts. Being an unincorporated agency of the State, a suit against it is
a suit against the State. The State cannot be sued
unless it has given its consent or has waived its
immunity. Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134
Pac. 626; Campbell Building Co. v. State Road
Commission, (Utah), 70 P. 2d 857. Defendants
do not argue in their briefs that. consent has been
given by the State or that" there has been any
waiver of the State's immunity from suit. Their

14
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argument is that the injunction suit is not against
the State. We cannot agree with this argument
insofar as the Road Commission as such is concerned. It is an agency of the State and a suit
against it is a suit against the State ... "
And the final ruling, as reported on page 512 of the
Pacific Reporter, is as follows:
'' rrhe alternative writ of prohibition heretofore issued herein is hereby modified, in accordance with the opinion herein expressed, so as to
eliminate from said writ any prohibition against
proceedings in the case therein referred to as
against defendants other than the State Road
Commission. Insofar as the writ prohibits proceedings in the district court as against the State
Road Commission, the same is made permanent ... "
In the Hjorth v. Whittenburg case, supra, the plaintiffs sought an injunction against the individual members
of the Road Commission to prevent a threatened and
alleged damage to their property, none of which was
taken or used for the roadway, by a raising in the grade
of the road as much as four feet above the level of the
contiguous ground. At the time of the hearing the
roadway was almost completely constructed and the
district court permitted an amendment to the complaint
to include damages and thereafter assessed damages
against the individual members of the Road Commission
upon the authority of the Fourth District Court case.
Upon the appeal this Court held that the members of the
Road Commission were not personally liable for damages
where they acted in good faith to improve the highway.
15
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Both the plaintiffs in this case and the Court recognized
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applicable
as far as the State of Utah and the State Road Commission were concerned.
The only difference between the fact situation in
these two decided cases and the present one is that the
appellant here was fortunate enough to have a parcel
of property that 'vas included within the original condemnation action, although this parcel '\vas a considerable distance away from the one for which it now seeks
damage. That one rule of la'v should apply to appellant
and another rule for those not so fortunately situated is,
of course, unthinkable; and we respectfully submit that
this is an attempted proceeding against the State of
Utah wherein there has been no waiver of sovereign
immunity and that no jurisdiction has been conferred
on the trial court and that the granting of the motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper
and should be affirmed.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission of
Utah, 327 U.S. 573, 90 L.Ed. 862, states the rule applicable that statutes waiving sovereign immunity are subject to a strict and literal interpretation in favor of the
state and against the waiver of immunity. In that case
the plaintiff sought to recover taxes claimed to be wrongfully exacted by suit in the federal courts under a statute
providing that the action could be brought in any court
of competent jurisdiction. The Court held that this

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

language 'vould be construed to apply only to courts of
the State of Utah and used this language "that clear
declaration of a state's consent to suit against itself in
the federal court on fiscal claims is required.''
The annotation following the above case at 90 L.Ed.
869 generally covers the subject and emphasizes the
general rule that statutes waiving sovereign immunity
are to be strictly construed.
The following three points of the brief of respondent
are written without regard to this question of sovereign
immunity; but their consideration and a ruling thereon
would become unnecessary if this Honorable Court sustains the position we have taken here.

POINT II.
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR CONDEMNATION AND DESTRUCTION
OF ANY ALLEGED OR CLAIMED RECIPROCAL
COVENANTS; BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, ANY
ALLEGED DAMAGE OR INJURY THAT APPELLANT CLAIMS TO HAVE SUFFERED IS NOT
ACTIONABLE AGAINST AND NOT COMPENSABLE BY THE STATE OF UTAH.
In its argument as to its point two, appellant assumes
the existence of an agreement between itself and the
Wagener Improvement Company. As we have declared
in our statement of facts and as we will explore more
fully later in this brief, we contend that there wa~ no
material proof as to the existence of any agreement, but
rather that the proof showed that appellant was relying
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upon an expectation and a hope as to the future development by the Wagener Improvement Company.
However, even if this agreement were sufficiently
shown by the evidence so as to make it proper to submit
it to a jury, we contend that it still does not provide a
basis upon which compensable damage could be allowed
the appellant; and we believe that appellant has misapplied the law to the facts of the instant case and that
it fails to distinguish between restrictive covenants that
apply to the land and create a negative easement therein
and on the other hand a purely personal agreement between two parties that has nothing to do with the land
involved.
Appellant secured the admission of Exhibit 8 over
respondent's objection. (R. 81). This exhibit constituted
the restrictive covenants that had been recorded with
respect to Oak Hills Plat A, which was a small area some
distance across the canyon from the property involved
in the present action. The evidence also showed a hope
and an expectation that at some future date and, depending on a number of conditional factors, restrictive
covenants of a similar nature but with changes to meet
other conditions, which conditions are not named or
described, would be drawn up and filed for the property
on the south side of the canyon and also for the property
of the appellant.
At this juncture, we desire to emphasize that there
is not a scintilla of evidence that the condemnation of the
property by the State of Utah had any effect whatsoever
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upon these restrictive covenants or in any way violated
their terms; but, on the contrary, it can be just as well
imagined that the condemnation proceeding enhanced
the value of appellant's property.
The cases that appellant cites under Point Two of
his brief are collected and discussed at considerable
length in the case cited by appellant, namely, Johnstone
v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co., 245 1Iich. 65, 222 N.W. 325,
67 A.L.R. 373, and in the annotation at 67 A.L.R. 385,
which supplements a prior annotation in 17 A.L.R. 554.
A still later annotation at 122 A.L.R. 1464 reviews these
same cases and some later ones and comes to this conelusion:
''But in determining whether the right thus
created is one of property for which compensation must be made when land subject to such right
is taken by eminent domain or is voluntarily
deeded to be used for public purposes, the courts
remain in irreconcilable conflict. ''
In connection with this point, we feel compelled to
cite three cases because the language used seems particularly applicable. In each case, the court held that
building restrictions had no basis for value in condemnation proceedings.
In Doan v. Cleveland Short LineR. Co., 92 Ohio St.
4:61, 112 N .E. 505, the Court said:
''If such restriction is not to be construed as
preventing the use of the property for public
purposes, then of course there is no violation on
the part of the defendant, and it follows that no
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recoverY can be had. If, on the other hand, it is
to be co~1strued as prohihiting the use of the property for any purpose other than that of residences,
it would prevent a public use of the lots and
thereby defeat the right of eminent domain. No
covenant in a deed restricting the real estate conveyed to certain uses and preventing other uses
can operate to prevent the state, or any body
politic or corporate having the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, from devoting
such property to a public use. The right of
eminent domain rests p.pon public necessity, and
a contract or covenant or plan of allotment which
attempts to prevent the exercise of that right is
clearly against public policy and is therefore
illegal and void. Plaintiff's right to compensation,
if it exists, must be based upon the restrictive
covenant in the deeds and the general plan adopted. To give to plaintiff this right we would be
compelled to recognize a right existing under
"\¥hat we hold to be an invalid restriction."
And in United States v. Certa.in Lands, 112 Fed. 622,
the Court said:
''While the owners may so contract as to control private business, and there by increase the
values of their estates, they are not entitled so to
contract as to control the action of the government, or to increase the values of their lands by
any expectation or belief that the government will
not carry on public 'vorks in their vicinity, or that
in case it does it 'viii compensate them for the loss
due to the defeat of their expectation that it would
not .... Each lando,vner holds his estate subject
to the public necessity for the exercise of the right
of eminent domain for public purposes. He cannot evade this by any agreement with his neighbor, nor can his neighbor acquire a right from a
20

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

private individual which imposes a new burden
upon the public in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain.''
And in Moses v. Hazen, 63 App. D.C. 104, 69 F. 2d
842, 98 A.L.R. 386, the Court said :
''As against the sovereign in discharge of a
governmental function, rights such as are here
claimed are not enforceable to restrict or burden
the exercise of eminent domain; for the claims
of these appellants are not for damage to what
are sometimes called true easements, as right of
passage or rights to light and air, which are land
and subject to condemnation as other interests in
land, but the restrictions on \Vhich appellants rely
are not truly property rights, but contractual
rights, which the government in the exercise of
its sovereign power may take without payment of
compensation.''
And the further statement was also made that
''It is the rule in such cases that covenants
limiting the use of property must be strictly construed and not extended by implication.''
A holding to the same effect was reached in the cases
of Anderson v. Lynch, (Ga.), 3 S.E. 2d 85, 122 A.L.R.
1456, Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 Pac.
1080, and Sackett v. Los Angeles City School District,
118 Cal. A pp. 254, 5 P. 2d 23.
The statement of the Court in the case of Moses v.
Hazen, supra, foreshadows and supplements the statement of this Court in United States v. Fourth District
Court, supra, where it was stated:
21
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"We believe that the line of dem.arcation
should be drfnvn at the point of "aetiona ble damage.'' The Constitution elearly does not requirP
compensation for damages not recognized as
actionable at common la-\Y, but for a damaging of
property ''to the actionable degree'' the Constitution makers intended the landowner to have
just compensation equally with the landowner
'vhose property was physically taken.''
We have now discussed and, we believe, fairly analyzed those cases dealing with restrictive covenants
applicable to real property subject to condemnation, and
it should be noted that in each case the use to be made
of the property by the condemnor is conceded to be a
violation of the restrictive covenant. We again allude
to the statement that we heretofore made to the effect
that appell~nt has presented no evidence of any kind
that would show that the proposed use by the State of
Utah "\Vould in any manner effect a breach of those
covenants.
Ho"\\rever, 've believe that appellant is not relying
upon .these restrictive covenants even though its statement of points specifically refers to them, but rather
that it basis its damage upon the alleged oral agreement
with Wagener Improvement Company as to future development. It is our contention that there was no material
evidence of the existence of any agreement and that is
the subject of our next point in this brief; and, at this
point, we are assuming that the agreement was proved
and we shall demonstrate that this fact does not entitle
the app.ellant to any damage as against the condemnor,
State of Utah.
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It should be first noted that this alleged agreement
is purely a personal contract between the appellant and
Wagener Improvement Company and that by no stretch
of the imagination could it be called a restrictive covenant as to the land involved. On page 9 of its brief, appellant refers to it as "reciprocal agreements" and it
could be nothing more as it has none of the required
elements that go to make a negative easement or an
equitable servitude, as these restrictive covenants are
called.
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, Section
5.76(2) at page 115, contains a statement that we contend is controlling and we have found no cases contrary
to the ones there cited. The section above mentioned
reads as follows :
''The mere fact that a business has assumed
the form of existing profitable contracts with
respect to the use of the land does not, under
ordinary circumstances, warrant the award of
damages in excess of the value of the land. The
strongest examples of such contracts are leases
of the premises or agreements to lease the same
to solvent tenants at a greater rent than the
present fair rental value of the premises, and
contracts to sell the produce of the soil at a profitable price. The taking of the land terminates all
contracts in respect to its use and the owner is
under no liability for his failure to carry out such
agreements, but it is well settled that he is not
entitled to compensation for the loss of his contracts. No distinction has been drawn between a
damage to business caused by making impossible
the performance of existing contracts and a damage consisting of the loss of expected contracts.
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If an o"\vner of land taken hy eminent domain is
not entitled to compensation for the loss of profi1 s
on his contracts, existing and expected, taken as
a whole-that is, injury to his business-a fortiori
he is not entitled to compensation for the loss of
expected profits on a single contract.
"It is true that the constitution of the United
States prohibits a state from enacting any la\r
impairing the obligation of contracts, but a statute authorizing the taking of land with respect
to the use of which a valid contract is in existence
is not obnoxious to this provision, even if no compensation is awarded for the annulment of the
contract, since all contracts for the use of land
are entered into in view of the possible taking of
the land for public use, and the sovereign power
of eminent domain cannot be impaired by contracts of private parties. It is only when "property" is created by contract, as in the case of a
franchise or a lease, that the protection of the
constitution can be invoked.''
Orgel on Valuation under Eminent Domain, Section
·75, contains a similar statement; and finally we desire to
cite the case of Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah

42, 172 Pac. 689, and the statement by the Court on page
694 of the Pacific Reporter as follows :
''Indeed "\ve kno"\v of no case which holds that
a parol agreement to maintain fences runs with
the land. ' '
It is, therefore, respectfully contended by the respondent that the authorities above cited show conclusively that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was properly granted by the trial court on all of
24
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the following grounds and is sustainable on any one of
them:
1. That under the law and the decisions of the State
of Utah, restrictive covenants do not constitute actionable
damage in eminent domain proceedings and are not compensable by the State of Utah.
2. That there is a complete failure of proof as to
any injury or damage to any land subject to those restrictive covenants and a complete lack of any evidence
as to the effect of the condemnation proceeding in relation to those restrictive covenants.
3. That it has been universally held that private
contracts may not impair the sovereign right of eminent
domain.

POINT III.
THE APPELLANT HAS NOT SUSTAINED THE
BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED OF IT AND THE
EVIDENCE AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS THAT ANY
ALLEGED INJURY OR DAMAGE TO IT WAS CONTINGENT, RENIOTE AND SPECULATIVE.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE APPELLANT
AND WAGENER IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, AND
THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS
PROPER AS THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND
MATERIAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY
AGREEMENT.
25
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\\T e are combining for argument points three and

four in order to avoid repetition and because the argument in favor of one point of necessity is applicable to
the other; and, generally, we are here concerned with
the failure of proof. And, at this point, may we state
that 've are not taking issue with appellant's point three,
not necessarily because we agree with its argument but
because, as '"e have demonstrated, the statute of frauds
is not applicable and is immaterial. We do, however,
very strenuously take issue with appellant's first statement under his point three and we do most emphatically
deny the existence of any agreement between Bird &
Evans, Inc., and Wagener Improvement Company and
the creation of any interest in land by reason thereof.
First, we desire to discuss the evidence presented
and to compare it with the required elements of a contract. A contract must have parties, a subject matter,
an offer and acceptance, a consideration and a time of
performance, among other things. In the present case
the subject matter is at best an indefinite and tenuous
thing; there is, as far as we can ascertain from the
record, no consideration of any kind passing to the
Wagener Improvement Company; and the time of performance was absolutely missing. The only evidence
offered with respect to this claimed agreement was
through the witness, Dean Brayton, who in effect stated
that he felt that he was an agent of both parties, but his
statements as to an agreement fell far short of proving
its existence. If this present action were one instituted
26
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by Bird & Evans, Inc. against the Wagener Improvement
Company for breach of this alleged agreement and to
recover from them the cost of bringing the utilities to
the very doorstep of appellant, Bird & Evans, Inc., we
do not feel that anyone would seriously contend that an
agreement had been proved upon which a recovery of
that sort could be had. The State of Utah, by reason
of this condemnation proceeding, should certainly be in
no worse a position in this respect than would their
condemnees.
With respect to the restrictive covenants themselves
that were actually filed with relation to one part of the
property condemned, there is some evidence of an agreement that they would be generally applicable to all of
the property in the area, including that of appellant,
although when they might have become applicable was
most speculative. However, the existence of this agreement need be of no concern inasmuch as there is not a
scintilla of evidence in the record to indicate, even by
inference, that the exercise of the right of eminent domain by the respondent here violated or constituted a
breach of those covenants.
The proof offered as to the damage suffered by
appellant based upon the cost of bringing utilities to his
property and of building sidewalks and streets is so far
removed from the injury and damage that might have
resulted from a breach of the restrictive covenants that
it appears ridiculous.
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The rule applicable is well stated in Rose v. State,
19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505, where the Court at page 520
of the Pacific Reporter stated:
"In states such as California, where the recovery of damages depends upon the infringement
of some right which the owner of land possesses
in connection with his property, decisions have
clearly indicated that, although the measure of
damages is generally the dimunition in market
value, the evidence relied upon to establish such
dimunition must be based upon the depreciation
flowing from the actionable injury which is the
basis for the right to recover damages. Thus, in
People v. Gianni, 130 Cal. App. 584, 20 P. 2d 87,
a small portion of land was taken for public high. "ray purposes. It was contended on behalf of the
landowner that because a small portion of land
had been taken and because he was entitled to
recover for that injury, the damages to his remaining land should be based upon the total depreciation in the value of his remaining property
even though that depreciation was caused primarily by an admittedly noncompensable element
of damage, that is, diversion of traffic. The court
said, however, that while dimunition in market
value was ordinarily the test of damage to real
property, the damages must be limited to those
which accrue by 'reason of the legal injury for
which compensation was due.''
And in City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal. App.
2d 180, 210 P. 2d 717, at page 723, the Court said:
"The award of $40,000 for the alleged excess
cost of an overpass is indefensible even if the
evidence admitted with reference thereto was unobjectionable. While the ·recovery of damages is
not limited to instances of actual invasion of the
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land itself, yet damages can be justified only by
evidence of direct physical disturbance of an
existing right, either public or private, which the
owner possesses in connection with his property
and which gives an additional value to it and by
evidence that through such disturbance he has
sustained a special damage with respect to his
property or to a right appurtenant thereto different from or in excess of that suffered by the
public in general.''
And, on page 724, the Court said :
''There can be no detriment to a right which
never existed and no compensation for a loss not
sustained. . . . Manifestly plain tiff cannot be required to pay damages for injury to a non-existent
right or for a mere hope, surmise, conjecture or
expectancy that a right might possibly be obtained
in the future, . . . or for remote, speculative,
imaginary, uncertain or conjectural possibilities.''
We respectfully submit that the language above
quoted is particularly applicable to the claims of the
appellants here and that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper.
CONCLUSION
The trial court granted the respondent's written
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
motion was based upon three specified grounds, namely,
the sovereign immunity of the State of Utah, the noncompensable nature of the alleged damage of the appellant and the complete failure of the appellant to sustain
the burden of proof. We submit that the foregoing
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argument and authorities demonstrate conclusively that
the trial court's granting of this motion is sustainable
on all three of the grounds presented although it is only
necessary that it be sustained on any one. We respectfully urge upon this Court that the ruling of the trial
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
ROBERT B. PORTER
Assistant Attorney General

..·
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